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PROPOSED LEGISLATION TO IMPLEMENT THE 
CONVENTION METHOD OF AMENDING 
THE CONSTITUTION 
Sam ]. Ervin, Jr.* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
ARTICLE V 0£ the Constitution of the United States1 provides that constitutional amendments may be proposed in either 0£ two 
ways-by nvo-thirds of both houses of the Congress or by a conven-
tion called by the Congress in response to the applications of nvo-
thirds of the state legislatures. Although the framers of the Constitu-
tion evidently contemplated that the nvo methods of initiating 
amendments would operate as parallel procedures, neither superior 
to the other, this has not been the case historically. Each 0£ the 
twenty-five constitutional amendments ratified to date was proposed 
by the Congress under the first alternative. As a result, although the 
mechanics and limitations of congressional power under the first 
alternative are generally understood, very little exists in the way of 
precedent or learning relating to the unused alternative method in 
article V. This became distressingly clear recently, following the dis-
closure that thirty-two state legislatures had, in one form or another, 
petitioned the Congress to call a convention to propose a constitu-
tional amendment permitting states to apportion their legislatures 
on the basis of some standard other than the Supreme Court's "one 
man-one vote" requirement. The scant information and consider-
able misinformation and even outright ignorance displayed on the 
subject of constitutional amendment, both within the Congress and 
outside of it-and particularly the dangerous precedents threatened 
by acceptance of some of the constitutional misconceptions put forth 
-prompted me to introduce in the Senate a legislative proposal de-
signed to implement the convention amendment provision in arti-
cle V. This article will discuss that provision of the Constitution, 
• United States Senator from North Carolina.-Ed. 
1. The Congress, whenever two thirds of both Houses shall deem it necessary, shall 
propose Amendments to this Constitution, or, on the Application of the Legis-
latures of two thirds of the several States, shall call a Convention for proposing 
Amendments, which, in either Case, shall be valid to all Intents and Purposes, as 
part of this Constitution, when ratified by the Legislatures of three fourths of the 
several States, or by Conventions in three fourths thereof, as the one or the other 
Mode of Ratification may be proposed by the Congress; Provided that no Amend-
ment which may be made prior to the Year One thousand eight hundred and eight 
shall in any Manner affect the first and fourth Clauses in the Ninth Section of the 
first Article; and that no State, without its Consent, shall be deprived of its equal 
Suffrage in the Senate. 
U.S. CoNST. art. V. 
[ 875] 
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the major questions involved in its implementation, and the an-
swers to those questions supplied by the provisions of the bill, Senate 
Bill No. 2307.2 , 
II. BACKGROUND 
On March 26, 1962, the United States Supreme Court, in the 
landmark case of Baker v. Carr,8 held that state legislative appor-
tionment is subject to judicial review in federal courts, thus over-
ruling a long line of earlier decisions to the contrary. Two years 
later, on June 15, 1964, in Reynolds v. Sims,4 the controversial "one 
man-one vote" decision, the Court held that the equal protection 
clause of the fourteenth amendment requires that both houses of 
bicameral state legislatures be apportioned on a population basis. 
The two decisions evoked a storm of controversy. In the Con-
gress, dissatisfaction with the Court's intrusion into the hitherto 
nonjusticiable political thicket resulted in attempts in both houses 
to reverse the rulings by legislation or constitutional amendment. 
On August 19, 1964, the House of Representatives passed a bill in-
troduced by Representative Tuck of Virginia which would have 
stripped federal district courts of jurisdiction over state apportion-
ment cases and denied the Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction 
over such cases. The Senate declined to invoke that extreme remedy, 
passing instead a "sense of Congress" resolution that the state legis-
latures should be given time to reapportion before the federal judi-
ciary intervened further. In both 1965 and 1966, however, a majority 
of the Senate voted to propose the so-called "Dirksen amendment" 
to the Constitution, which would permit a state to apportion one 
house of its bicameral legislature on some standard other than pop-
ulation. But the amendment failed both times to get the required 
two-thirds vote, failing fifty-seven to thirty-nine in 1965 and fifty-
five to thirty-eight in 1966. 
A more extraordinary effect of the rulings in Baker v. Carr and 
Reynolds v. Sims was the activity generated in the state legislatures 
designed to reverse the Court's rulings by means of a constitutional 
amendment proposed by a convention convened under the second 
clause of article V. In December 1962, following Baker v. Carr, the 
Council of State Governments, at its Sixteenth Biennial General 
Assembly of the States, recommended that the state legislatures peti-
2. The text of the bill, as amended, is set forth as an appendix to this Article. As of 
this writing, the amended bill has not been approved by the Committee on the 
Judiciary. The reported bill may include additional amendments. 
3. 369 U.S. 186 (1962). 
4. 377 U.S. 533 (1964). 
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tion the Congress for a constitutional convention to propose three 
amendments, including an amendment to accomplish essentially the 
same purpose as the Tuck bill, that is, the denial to federal courts 
of original and appellate jurisdiction over state legislative apportion-
ment cases. In response to this call, twelve state petitions were sent 
to the Congress during 1963 requesting a constitutional convention 
to propose such an amendment.5 Although this was the largest num-
ber of petitions on the same subject ever received by the Congress 
in any one year, the total was far below the required thirty-four, and 
their receipt caused no excitement in the Congress and attracted 
no public attention. 
In December 1964, following the decision in Reynolds v. Sims, 
the Seventeenth Biennial General Assembly of the States recom-
mended that the state legislatures petition the Congress to convene 
a constitutional convention to propose an amendment along the 
lines of the Dirksen amendment, permitting the states to apportion 
one house of a bicameral legislature on some standard other than 
population. The response to this call was even greater than in 1963. 
Twenty-two states submitted constitutional convention petitions to 
Congress during the Eighty-ninth Congress (1965 and 1966) and 
four more during the first session of the Ninetieth Congress (1967). 
If one counted the petitions adopted by four other states, question-
able in regard to their proper receipt by Congress,6 this brought 
the total number of state petitions on the subject of state legislative 
apportionment to thirty-two. 
At this point, March 1967, the situation attracted the first at-
tention in the press. A New York Times story on March 18, 1967,7 
reported that only two more petitions were necessary to invoke the 
convention amendment procedure. The immediate reaction was a 
rash of newspaper editorials and articles, almost uniformly critical 
of the effort to obtain a convention, and a flurry of speeches on the 
subject in the Congress. Whether favorable or unfavorable to the 
efforts by the states, all of these press items and all of the congres-
sional speeches had one common denominator. They all bore the 
obvious imprint of the authors' feelings about the merits of state 
legislative apportionment. Those newspapers that had editorially 
supported the Supreme Court's decisions now decried the states' 
5. Copies of the applications referred to herein are on file in the offices of the Com-
mittees on the Judiciary of the United States Senate and House of Representatives. 
6. New Hampshire, Colorado, Utah, and Georgia have adopted applications, but 
copies are not on file with the Senate and House Judiciary Committees. 
7. The New York Times, March 18, 1967 (city ed.), at 1, col. 6. 
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"back-door assault on the Constitution."8 Those newspapers that 
had criticized one man-one vote now applauded the effort by the 
state legislatures to overrule the new principle by constitutional 
amendment. Much more disturbing to me was the fact that many 
of my colleagues in the Senate seemed to be influenced more by 
their views on the reapportionment issue than by concern for the 
need to answer objectively some of the perplexing constitutional 
questions raised by the states' action. Those Senators who had been 
critical of the "one man-one vote" decision and were eager to undo 
it now expressed the conviction that the Congress was obligated to 
call a convention when thirty-four petitions were on hand and that 
it had little power to judge the validity of state petitions. Those 
senators who agreed with the Supreme Court's ruling were now con-
tending that some or all of the petitions were invalid for a variety 
of reasons and should be discounted, and that, in any case, Congress 
did not have to call a convention if it did not wish to. Most dis-
tressing of all was the apparent readiness of everyone to concede 
that any convention, once convened, would be unlimited in the 
scope of its authority and empowered to run rampant over the Con-
stitution, proposing any amendment or amendments that happened 
to strike its fancy. That interpretation, supported neither by logic 
nor constitutional history, served the convenience of both sides in 
the apportionment controversy. Those who did not want to call 
a convention that might propose a reapportionment amendment 
pointed out that an open convention would surely be a constitu-
tional nightmare. Opponents of one man-one vote cited the horrors 
of an open convention as an additional reason for proposal of a 
reapportionment amendment by the Congress. 
My conviction was that the constitutional questions involved 
were far more important than the reapportionment issue that had 
brought them to light, and that they should receive more orderly 
and objective consideration than they had so far been accorded. 
Certainly it would be grossly unfortunate if the partisanship over 
state legislative apportionment-and I am admittedly a partisan on 
that issue-should be allowed to distort an attempt at clarification 
of the amendment process, which in the long run must command 
a higher obligation and duty than any single issue that might be 
the subject of that process. Any congressional action on this subject 
would be a precedent for the future, and the unseemly squabble 
that had already erupted was to me a certain indication that only 
8. Editorial, The Washington Post, March 21, 1967, at A·IO, col. 1. 
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bad precedents could result from an effort to settle questions of 
procedure under article V simultaneously with the presentation of 
a substantive issue by two-thirds of the states. Although it is not 
easy to anticipate all of the problems that may develop in the con-
vention amendment process, nor to deal with those problems wisely 
in the abstract, I nevertheless felt that the wisest course would be 
to consider and enact permanent legislation to implement the con-
vention amendment provision in article V. 
I introduced S. 2307 on August 17, 1967. In my statement accom-
panying introduction, I stressed that I was not committed to the 
provisions of the bill as then drafted. I was convinced only of the 
necessity for action on the subject, action that might forestall a con-
gressional choice between chaos on the one hand and refusal to 
abide the commands of article V on the other. Open hearings on 
the bill were held on October 30 and 31, 1967, before the Senate 
Subcommittee on Separation of Powers. The testimony revealed de-
ficiencies in the bill and suggested modifications and additions. As 
a result, I have subsequently amended the bill in several respects. 
In discussing specific questions raised by the bill, I shall describe 
the relevant provision of the original draft and note the amend-
ments made since the hearings. 
Ill. QUESTIONS RAISED BY THE BILL 
Before going to specific issues and matters of detail, it seems 
appropriate to discuss briefly two threshold problems posed by 
the bill: whether the Congress has the power to enact such legis-
lation, and, if it does, what policy considerations should guide it 
in exercising such power. 
I have no doubt that the Congress has the power to legislate 
about the process of amendment by convention. The Congress is 
made the agency for calling the convention, and it is hard to see 
why the Congress should have been involved in this alternative 
method of proposal at all unless it was expected to determine such 
questions as when sufficient appropriate applications had been re-
ceived and to provide for the membership and procedures of the 
convention and for review and ratification of its proposals. Ob-
viously the fifty state legislatures cannot themselves legislate on this 
subject. The constitutional convention cannot do so for it must 
first be brought into being. All that is left, therefore, is the Con-
gress, which, in respect to this and other issues not specifically set-
tled by the Constitution, has the residual power to legislate on 
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matters that require uniform settlement. Add to this the weight of 
such decisions as Coleman v. lviiller,9 to the effect that questions 
arising in the amending process are nonjusticiable political ques-
tions exclusively in the congressional domain, and the conclusion 
seems inescapable that the Congress has plenary power to legislate 
on the subject of amendment by convention and to settle every 
point not actually settled by article V of the Constitution itself. 
With respect to the second problem, within what general policy 
limitations that power should be exercised, I think the Congress 
should be extremely careful to close as few doors as possible. Any 
legislation on this subject will be what might be called "quasi-or-
ganic" legislation; in England it would be recognized as a consti-
tutional statute. When dealing with such a measure, it is wise to 
bear in mind Marshall's well-worn aphorism that it is a Constitu-
tion we are expounding and not get involved in "an unwise attempt 
to provide, by immutable rules, for exigencies which, if foreseen 
at all, must [be] seen dimly, and which can best be provided for as 
they occur."10 This approach is reflected at several points in the bill, 
notably in its failure to try to anticipate and enumerate the various 
grounds on which Congress might justifiably rule a state petition 
invalid, and its failure to prescribe rigid rules of procedure for 
the convention. In addition, I think the Congress, in exercising its 
power under article V, should bear in mind that the Framers meant 
the convention method of amendment to be an attainable means 
of constitutional change. This legislation can be drawn so as to 
place as many hurdles as possible in the way of effective use of the 
process; or it can be drawn in a manner that will make such a process 
a possible, however improbable, method of amendment. The first 
alternative would be a flagrant disavowal of the clear language and 
intended function of article V. I have assumed that the Congress 
will wish to take the second road, and the bill is drawn with that 
principle in mind. 
A. Open or Limited Convention? 
Perhaps the most important issue raised by the bill is the ques-
tion of the power of the Congress to limit the scope and authority 
of a convention convened under article V in accordance with the 
desires of the states as set forth in their applications. This was, as 
I have noted, one of the issues that most troubled me when I first 
heard of the efforts by the states to call a convention. 
9. 307 U.S. 433 (1939). 
10. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 407, 415 (1819). 
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It has been argued that the subject matter of a convention con-
vened under article V cannot be limited, since a constitutional con-
vention is a premier assembly of the people, exercising all the power 
that the people themselves possess, and therefore supreme to all 
other governmental branches or agencies. Certainly, according to 
this argument, the states may not themselves, in their applications, 
dictate limitations on the convention's deliberations. They may not 
require the Congress to submit to the convention a given text of 
an amendment, nor even a single subject or idea. For the conven-
tion must be free to "propose" amendments, which suggests the 
freedom to canvass matters afresh and to weigh all possibilities and 
alternatives rather than ratify a single text or idea. The states may 
in their applications specify the amendment or amendments they 
would hope the convention would propose. But once the Congress 
calls the convention, those specifications would not control its de-
liberations. The convention could not be restricted to the consid-
eration of certain topics and forbidden to consider certain other 
topics, nor could it be forbidden to write a new constitution if it 
should choose to do so. 
I will concede that such an interpretation can be wrenched from 
article V-but only through a mechanical and literal reading of 
the words of the article, totally removed from the context of their 
promulgation and history. My reading of the debates on article V 
at the Philadelphia Convention and the other historical materials 
bearing on the intended function of the amendment process11 leads 
me to the opposite conclusion. As I understand the debates, the 
Founders were concerned, first, that they not place the new govern-
ment in the same straitjacket that inhibited the Confederation, un-
able to change fundamental law without the consent of every state. 
The amendment process, rather a novelty for the time, was there-
fore included in the Constitution itself. Second, the final form of 
article V was dictated by a major compromise between those dele-
gates who would utilize the state legislatures as the sole means of 
initiating amendments and those who would lodge that power ex-
clusively in the national legislature. The forces at the convention 
that sought to limit the power of originating amendments to the 
11. E.g., LEGISLATIVE REFERENCE SERV., LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, THE CONSTITUTION OF 
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION, s. Doc. No. 39, 88th 
Cong., 1st Sess. 135-36 (1964); THE FEDERALIST Nos. 43 & 85 (J. Cooke ed. 1961); L. 
ORFIELD, AMENDING THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION (1942); THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL 
CONVENTION OF 1787 (M. Farrand ed. 1937). The relevant excerpts from these and other 
sources are printed as an appendix to the Hearings on the Federal Constitutional Con-
vention Before the Subcomm. on Separation of Powers of the Senate Comm. on the 
Judiciary, United States Senate, Oct. 30 and 31, 1967. 
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states were at first dominant. The original Virginia Plan, first ap-
proved by the convention, excluded the national legislature from 
participation in the amendment process. On reconsideration, the 
forces that would limit the power of origination of amendments to 
the national legislature became prevalent. The arguments on both 
sides were persuasive: the improprieties or excesses of power in the 
national government would not likely be corrected except by state 
initiative, while improprieties by the state governments or defi-
ciencies in national power would not likely be corrected except by 
national initiative. In the spirit that typified the 1787 Convention, 
the result was acceptance of a Madison compromise proposal which 
read, as the final article was to read, in terms of alternative methods. 
It is dear that neither of the two methods of amendment was 
expected by the Framers to be superior to the other or easier of 
accomplishment. There is certainly no indication that the national 
legislature was intended to promote individual amendments while 
the state legislatures were to be concerned with more extensive re-
visions. On the contrary, there is strong evidence that what the mem-
bers of the convention were concerned with in both cases was the 
power to make specific amendments. They did not appear to antic-
ipate a need for a general revision of the Constitution. And cer-
tainly this was understandable, in light of the difficulties that they 
had in finding the compromises to satisfy the divergent interests 
needed for ratification of their efforts. Provision in article V for 
two exceptions to the amendment power12 underlines the notion 
that the convention anticipated specific amendment or amendments 
rather than general revision. For it is doubtful that these exceptions 
could have been expected to control a later general revision. 
This construction is supported by references to the amendment 
process in the Federalist Papers. In Federalist No. 43, James Madison 
explained the need and function of article V as follows: 
That useful alterations will be suggested by experience, could 
not but be foreseen. It was requisite therefore that a mode for in-
troducing them should be provided. The mode preferred by the 
Convention seems to be stamped with every mark of propriety. It 
guards equally against that extreme facility which would render the 
Constitution too mutable; and that extreme difficulty which might 
perpetuate its discovered faults. It moreover equally enables the 
general and the state governments to originate the amendment of 
errors as they may be pointed out by the experience on one side or 
on the other. 
12. See the text of art. V quoted in note 1 supra. 
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Hamilton, in Federalist No. 85, was even more emphatic in point-
ing out the possibility of specific as well as general amendment of 
the Constitution on the initiative of the state legislatures: 
But every amendment to the constitution, if once established, 
would be a single proposition, and might be brought fonvard singly. 
There would then be no necessity for management or compromise, 
in relation to any other point, no giving nor taking. The will of the 
requisite number would at once bring the matter to a decisive issue. 
And consequently whenever nine or rather ten states, were united 
in the desire of a particular amendment, that amendment must in-
fallibly take place. 
Apart from being inconsistent with the language and history of 
article V, the contention that any constitutional convention must be 
a wide open one is neither a practicable nor a desirable one. If the 
subject matter of amendments were to be left entirely to the con-
vention, it would be hard to expect the states to call for a con-
vention in the absence of a general discontent with the existing 
constitutional system. This construction would effectively destroy 
the power of the states to originate the amendment of errors pointed 
out by experience, as Madison expected them to do. Alternatively, 
under that construction, applications for a limited convention de-
riving in some states from a dissatisfaction with the school desegre-
gation cases, in others because of the school prayer cases, and in still 
others by reason of objection to the Miranda rule, could all be com-
bined to make up the requisite two-thirds of the states needed to 
meet the requirements of article V. I find it hard to believe that 
this is the type of consensus that was thought to be appropriate to 
calling for a convention. For if such disparate demands were suf-
ficient, all the applications to date-and there are a large number 
of them-should be added up to see whether, in what is considered 
an appropriate span of time, two-thirds of the states have made de-
mands for a constitutional convention to propose amendments, no 
matter the cause for applications or the specifications contained in 
them. :Moreover, once such a convention were convened, it could 
refuse to consider any of the problems or subjects specified in the 
states' applications, and instead propose amendments on other sub-
jects or rewrite the Constitution in a manner unacceptable to any 
of the applicant states. 
My construction of article V, with reference to the initiation of 
the amendment procedure by the state legislatures, is consistent with 
the literal language of the article as well as its history, and is more 
desirable and practicable than the alternative construction. As I see 
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it, the intention of article V was to place the power of initiation of 
amendments in the state legislatures. The function of the conven-
tion was to provide a mechanism for effectuating this initiative. The 
role of the states in filing their applications would be to identify 
the problem or problems that they believed to call for resolution 
by way of amendment. The role of the convention that would be 
called by reason of such action by the states would then be to decide 
whether the problem called for correction by constitutional amend-
ment and, if so, to frame the amendment itself and propose it for 
ratification as provided in article V. The bill carries out this inten-
tion in keeping not only with the letter but also with the spirit of 
article V. 
The bill provides that state petitions to the Congress which re-
quest the calling of a convention under article V shall state the 
nature of the amendment or amendments to be proposed by such 
convention. Upon receipt of valid applications from two-thirds or 
more of the states requesting a convention on the same subject or 
subjects, the Congress is required to call a convention by concur-
rent resolution, specifying in the resolution the nature of the amend-
ment or amendments for the consideration of which the convention 
is being called. The convention may not propose amendments on 
other subjects and, if it does, the Congress may refuse to submit 
them to the states for ratification. 
Under these provisions, the states could not require the Congress 
to submit to a convention a given text of an amendment, demanding 
an up or down vote on it alone. But they could require the Con-
gress to submit a single subject or problem, demanding action on 
it alone. They could not, however, define the subject so narrowly 
as to deprive the convention of all deliberative freedom. To use 
the reapportionment issue as an example, the states could not re-
quire the Congress to call a convention to accept or reject the exact 
text of the reapportionment amendment recommended by the Coun-
cil of State Governments, for then the convention would be merely 
a ratifying body. But they could properly petition for a convention 
to consider the propriety of proposing a constitutional amendment 
to deal with the reapportionment problems raised by the Supreme 
Court decisions, defining those problems in specific terms. The con-
vention would then be confined to that subject, but it would be free 
to consider the propriety of proposing any amendment and the form 
the amendment should take-that of the Dirksen proposal, the Tuck 
proposal, or some other form. To take another example, those states 
which might desire a convention to deal with the Escobedo-Miranda 
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issue could phrase their petitions generally in terms of the problem 
of federal control over the criminal processes of the states. The con-
vention would then be confined to that subject, but would never-
theless have great deliberative freedom to canvass all possible solu-
tions and propose whatever amendment or amendments it deemed 
appropriate to respond to the problems identified by the states. 
I am convinced that these provisions of the bill fully accord with 
the mandate of article V, its history, and intended function. 
B. May Congress Refuse To Call a Convention? 
Perhaps the next most important question raised by the bill is 
whether the Congress has any discretion to refuse to call a conven-
tion in the face of appropriate applications from a sufficient num-
ber of states. 
Article V states that Congress "shall" call a convention upon the 
applications of the legislatures of two-thirds of the states. I have 
absolutely no doubt that the article is peremptory and that the 
duty is mandatory, leaving no discretion to the Congress to review 
the wisdom of the state applications. Certainly this is the more de-
sirable construction, consonant with the intended arrangement of 
article V as described in the preceding section of this article. The 
founders included the convention alternative in the amending arti-
cle to enable the states to initiate constitutional reform in the event 
the national legislature refused to do so. To concede to the Con-
gress any discretion to consider the wisdom and necessity of a par-
ticular convention call would in effect destroy the role of the states. 
The comments of both Madison and Hamilton, subsequent to 
the 1787 Convention, sustain this construction. In a letter on the 
subject, Madison observed that the question concerning the calling 
of a convention "will not belong to the Federal Legislature. If two-
thirds of the states apply £or one, Congress cannot refuse to call it: 
if not, the other mode of amendments must be pursued."18 Hamil-
ton, in the Federalist No. 85, stated: 
By the fifth article of the plan the congress will be obliged, "on 
the application of the legislatures of two-thirds of the states, (which 
at present amounts to nine) to call a convention for proposing 
amendments, which shall be valid to all intents and purposes, as 
part of the constitution, when ratified by the legislatures of three-
fourths of the states, or by conventions in three-fourths thereof." 
Ill. U.S. BUREAU OF Rou.s AND LIBRARY, DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE CONSTITUTION 
OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA V, 141, 143, quoting Madison's letter to Mr. Eve, 
dated Jan. 2, 1789. 
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The words of this article are peremptory. The congress "shall call a 
convention." Nothing in this particular is left to the discretion. 
It has been argued forcefully_ that, notwithstanding the language 
of article V, the Congress need not call a convention if it does not 
wish to do so, and that, in any event no legislation such as this can 
commit a future Congress to call a convention against its judgment. 
This argument is based on the premise that although article V pro-
vides that Congress "shall" call a convention if enough states apply, 
this word may be interpreted to mean "may" for all practical pur-
poses, since the courts are not apt to try to enforce the obligation 
if Congress wishes to evade it. I cannot accept such a flagrant dis-
regard of clear language and purpose. 
Although it may be true that no legislation by one Congress can 
bind a subsequent Congress to vote for a convention, and that the 
courts will not intervene, it is my strong feeling that the bill should 
recognize the fact that the Congress has a strict constitutional duty 
to call a convention if a sufficient number of proper applications 
are received. The bill does this by providing that it shall be the duty 
of both houses to agree to a concurrent resolution calling a conven-
tion whenever it shall be determined that two-thirds of the state 
legislatures have properly petitioned for a convention to propose 
an amendment or amendments on the same subject. Concededly, 
the Congress cannot be forced by the courts or by the provisions of 
this bill to vote for a particular convention. However, every mem-
ber has taken an oath to support the Constitution, and I cannot be-
lieve a majority of the Congress will choose to ignore its clear obliga-
tion. I would hope, moreover, that this bill will facilitate the path 
to congressional action by underlining the obligation of the Con-
gress to act. 
C. Sufficiency of State Applications 
Assuming the Congress may not weigh the wisdom and necessity 
of state applications requesting the calling of a constitutional con-
vention, does it have the power to judge the validity of state applica-
tions and state legislative procedures adopting such applications? 
Clearly the Congress has some such power. The fact alone that Con-
gress is made the agency for convening the convention upon the 
receipt of the requisite number of state applications suggests that 
it must exercise some power to judge the validity of those applica-
tions. The impotence or withdrawal of the courts underlines the 
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necessity for lodging some such power in the Congress. The relevant 
question, then, concerns the extent of that power. 
It has been contended that Congress must have broad powers to 
judge the validity of state applications and that such power must 
include the authority to look beyond the content of an application, 
and its formal compliance with article V, to the legislative proce-
dures followed in adopting the application. The counterargument 
is that to grant Congress the power to reject applications, partic-
ularly if that power is not carefully circumscribed, would be to sup-
ply it with a means of avoiding altogether the obligation to call a 
convention. The result would be that the Congress could arbitrarily 
reject all applications on subjects it did not considerate appropriate 
for amendment, leaving us in effect with only one amendment pro-
cess. 
In drafting the bill I was mainly concerned with limiting the 
power of the Congress to frustrate the initiative of the states, partic-
ularly since the debate on the Senate floor at that time indicated 
that some Senators were inclined to seize on any slight irregularity 
in a petition as a basis for not counting it. My bill, as introduced, 
therefore set forth only requirements as to the content of state ap-
plications, leaving questions of legislative procedure for determina-
tion solely by the individual states, with their decisions made binding 
on the Congress and the courts. However, I think the hearings amply 
demonstrated the danger of disabling the Congress from reviewing 
the procedural validity of state petitions. In general, state legislatures 
ought to be masters of their own procedures. But this is a federal 
function that they would be performing, and the Congress should 
retain some power uniformly to settle the questions of irregularity 
that might arise. The bill has therefore been amended to remove 
the disability of the Congress to review legislative procedures. Under 
the amended bill, Congress would retain broad powers in this re-
spect, indeterminate and unforeseeable in nature, but to be exer-
cised, I would hope, rarely and with restraint. 
It might be well to say something at this point on a question 
that is much debated: whether a legislature that has been held to 
be malapportioned, or that is under a decree requiring it to reap-
portion and perhaps qualifying its powers in some measure before 
reapportionment, can validly pass a resolution for a constitutional 
convention. I should think in general that it could, unless an out-
standing decree forbids it to do so, either specifically or by mention 
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of some analogous forbidden function. To open to congressional re-
view the question of the propriety of state legislative composition 
would be to open a Pandora's box of constitutional doubts about 
the validity even of the fourteenth amendment. 
However, the bill does not expressly answer this question. This 
is one of the many questions of irregularity on which the Congress 
will have to work its will should the question be squarely presented 
in the form of thirty-four state applications including some passed 
by malapportioned legislatures. 
One further important point should be mentioned. Most of the 
states obviously do not now understand their role in designating 
subjects or problems for resolution by amendment, and many of 
them do not even know where to send their applications. By setting 
forth the formal.requirements with respect to content of state ap-
plications and designating the congressional officers to whom they 
must be transmitted, the bill furnishes guidance to the states on 
these questions and promises to avert in the future some of the prob-
lems that have arisen in the current effort to convene a convention. 
The bill also requires that all applications received by the Congress 
be printed in the Congressional Record and that copies be sent to 
all members of Congress and to the legislature of each of the other 
states. In this way, the element of congressional surprise can be elim-
inated, and each state can be given prompt and full opportunity to 
join in any call for a convention in which it concurs. 
D. The Role of State Governors 
The argument has been made that a state application for a con-
stitutional convention must be approved by both the legislature and 
the governor of the state to be effective. This argument rests on the 
claim that article V intended state participation in the process to 
involve the whole legislative process of the state as defined in the 
state constitution. I do not agree with that argument. We do not 
have here any question about the exercise of the lawmaking process 
by a state legislature in combination with whatever executive par-
ticipation might be called for by state law. We have rather a ques-
tion of heeding the voice of the people of a state in expressing the 
possible need for a change in the fundamental document. It seems 
clear to me that the Founders properly viewed the state legislatures 
as the sole representative of the people on such a matter, since the 
executive veto, a carryover from the requirement of royal assent, 
was not regarded as the expression of popular opinion at the time 
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of the 1787 Convention. And, to resort to the kind of literalism in-
voked by others as appropriate for construction of other provisions 
of article V, the language of the article definitely asserts that the 
appropriate applications are to come from "the Legislatures." 
Closely analogous court decisions support this interpretation. 
The Supreme Court in Hawke v. Smith, No. 114 interpreted the term 
"legislatures" in the ratification clause of article V to mean the 
representative lawmaking bodies of the states, since ratification of 
a constitutional amendment "is not an act of legislation within the 
proper sense of the word."15 Certainly the term "legislature" should 
have the same meaning in both the application clause and the rati-
fication clause of article V. Further support is found in the decision 
in Hollingsworth v. Virginia,16 in which the Court held that a con-
stitutional amendment approved for proposal to the states by a two-
thirds vote of Congress need not be submitted to the President for 
his signature or veto. 
The bill therefore provides specifically that a state application 
need not be approved by the state's governor in order to be effective. 
E. May a State Rescind Its Application? 
The question of whether a state should be allowed to rescind an 
application previously forwarded to the Congress is another of the 
political questions to which the courts have not supplied answers 
and presumably cannot. The Supreme Court has held that questions 
concerning the rescission of prior ratifications or rejections of amend-
ments proposed by the Congress are determinable solely by Con-
gress.17 Presumably, then, the question of rescission of an applica-
tion for a convention is also political and nonjusticiable. Although 
the Congress has previously taken the position that a state may not 
rescind its prior ratification of an amendment, it has taken no posi-
tion concerning rescission of applications. My strong conviction is 
that rescission should be permitted. Since a two-thirds consensus 
among the states at some point in time is necessary in order for the 
Congress to call a convention, the Congress should consider whether 
there has been a change of mind among some states that have earlier 
applied. Moreover, an application is not a final action, since it serves 
merely to initiate a convention, and does not commit even the ap-
14. 253 U.S. 221 (1920). 
15. Id. at 229. 
16. 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 378 (1798). 
17. Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 448-49 (1939). 
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plicant state to any substantive amendment that might eventually 
be proposed. 
The bill therefore provides that a state may rescind at any time 
before its application is included among an accumulation of applica-
tions from two-thirds of the states, at which time the obligation of 
the Congress to call a convention becomes fixed. Incidentally, the 
bill also provides that a state may rescind its prior ratification of an 
amendment proposed by the convention up until the time there are 
existing valid ratifications by three-fourths of the states, and that a 
state may change its mind and ratify a proposed amendment that it 
previously has rejected. 
F. How Long Does an Application Remain Valid? 
Another much debated point concerning state applications for 
a constitutional convention is timing. In order to be effective to 
mandate the Congress to act, within how long a period must ap-
plications be received from two-thirds of the state legislatures? Arti-
cle V is silent on this question, and neither the Congress nor the 
courts has supplied an answer. 
The Congress and the courts have agreed that constitutional 
amendments proposed by the Congress and submitted to the states 
for ratification can properly remain valid for ratification for a period 
of seven years. It has been felt that there should be a "reasonably 
contemporaneous" expression by three-fourths of the states that an 
amendment is acceptable in order for the Congress to conclude that 
a consensus in favor of the amendment exists among the people, and 
that ratification within a seven-year period satisfies this require-
ment.18 Presumably, the same principle should govern the applica-
tion stage of the constitutional amendment process. If so, the Con-
gress would not be required, nor empowered, to call a convention 
unless it received "relatively contemporaneous" valid applications 
from the necessary number of states. This rule seems sensible. The 
Constitution contemplates a concurrent desire for a convention on 
the part of the legislatures of a sufficient number of states, and such 
a concurrent desire can scarcely be said to exist, or to reflect in each 
state the will of the people, if too long a period of time has passed 
from the date of enactment of the first application to the date of 
enactment of the last. It is true that legislatures are free under the 
bill to change their minds and rescind their applications; but the 
passage of a repealer is a different and more difficult political act 
18. Dillon v. Gloss, 256 U.S. 368 (1921). 
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than the defeat, starting fresh, of an application calling for a consti-
tutional convention. The fact, therefore, that a legislature has not 
rescinded an application calling for a convention is an insufficient 
indication that the state in question, after the passage of a long period 
of time, still favors the calling of a convention. 
What, then, is a proper period during which tendered applica-
tions are sufficiently contemporaneous to be counted together? Some 
Senators and scholars have suggested that two years, the lifetime of 
a Congress, would be a reasonable period. Others have suggested 
that petitions should remain valid for a generation. My feeling when 
I drafted the bill was that six years would be a reasonable compro-
mise. However, the hearings revealed a general disposition among 
the witnesses to agree on a four-year period. Since this would be 
long enough to afford ample opportunity to all the state legislatures 
to join in the call for a convention-particularly in view of the re-
quirement in the bill that all other states be given immediate notice 
of any application received by the Congress-I have concluded that 
a four-year period is preferable. 
The bill has therefore been amended to provide that an applica-
tion shall remain valid for four years after receipt by the Congress 
unless sooner rescinded. The bill also provides that rescission must 
be accomplished by means of the same legislative procedures fol-
lowed in adopting the application in question, and that the Congress 
retains power to judge the validity of those proceedings. 
G. Calling the Convention 
The bill provides that the Secretary of the Senate and the Clerk 
of the House of Representatives shall keep a record of the number 
of state applications received, according to subject matter. Whenever 
two-thirds of the states have submitted applications on the same sub-
ject or subjects, the presiding officer of each house shall be notified 
and shall announce the same on the floor. Each house is left free to 
adopt its own rules for determining the validity of the applications, 
presumably by reference to a committee followed by floor action. 
Once a determination has been made that there are valid applica-
tions from two-thirds or more of the state legislatures on the same 
subject or subjects, each house must agree to a concurrent resolution 
providing for the convening of a constitutional convention on such 
subject or subjects. The concurrent resolution would designate the 
place and time of meeting of the convention, set forth the nature 
of the amendment or amendments the convention is empowered to 
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consider and propose, and provide for such other things as the pro-
vision of funds to pay the expenses of the convention and to com-
pensate the delegates. The convention would be required to be con-
vened not later than one year after adoption of the resolution. 
As introduced, the bill required the Congress to designate in the 
concurrent resolution convening a convention the manner in which 
any amendments proposed by the convention must be ratified by 
the states and the period within which they must be ratified or 
deemed inoperative. Testimony at the hearings suggested that these 
determinations might properly be influenced by the nature of the 
amendments proposed and that they should therefore not be re-
quired to be made at the time the convention is called. For example, 
certain proposed amendments might call for ratification by state 
conventions rather than state legislatures, and certain circumstances 
might indicate a shorter or longer period than usual during which 
ratification should take place. The Congress should be able to make 
those decisions after it has the convention's proposals. The bill there-
fore has been amended to so provide. 
H. Selection and Apportionment of Delegates 
The bill as introduced provided that each state should have as 
many delegates as it is entitled to representatives in Congress, to 
be elected or appointed as provided by state law. However, the hear-
ings revealed a general feeling that the national interest is too closely 
affected to permit each state to decide how its delegates to a national 
constitutional convention shall be elected, or, indeed, appointed. For 
this reason, the bill has been amended to require that delegates be 
elected-not appointed-and that they be elected by the same con-
stituency that elects the states' representatives in Congress. Under 
the amended bill, each state will be entitled to as many delegates as 
it is entitled to Senators and Representatives in Congress. Two dele-
gates in each state will be elected at large and one delegate will be 
elected from each congressional district in the manner provided by 
state law. Vacancies in a state's delegation will be filled by appoint• 
ment of the governor. 
I. Convention Procedure and Voting 
The bill provides that the Vice President of the United States 
shall convene the constitutional convention, administer the oath of 
office of the delegates and preside until a presiding officer is elected. 
The presiding officer will then preside over the election of other 
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officers and thereafter. Further proceedings of the convention will 
be in accordance with rules adopted by the convention. A daily 
record of all convention proceedings, including the votes of dele-
gates, shall be kept, and shall be transmitted to the Archivist of the 
United States within thirty days after the convention terminates. 
The convention must terminate its proceedings within one year of 
its opening unless the period is extended by the Congress by con-
current resolution. 
As introduced, the bill provided that each state should have one 
vote on all matters before the convention, including the proposal of 
amendments. This was decided upon in deference to the method 
followed in the 1787 Convention rather than from a conviction that 
this would be the necessarily proper procedure in conventions called 
under article V. On the basis of the testimony presented at the hear-
ings, I have decided that unit voting would not be appropriate for 
such conventions. The reasons for unit voting in the 1787 Conven-
tion were peculiar to the background against which that convention 
worked and are not valid today. Moreover, the states, as units, will 
have equal say in the ratification process. It seems appropriate, there-
fore, to recognize the interests of majority rule in the method of pro-
posing amendments. Hence, the bill has been amended to provide 
that each state delegate shall have one vote so that the voting strength 
of each state will be in proportion to its population. 
Finally, the bill provides that amendments may be proposed by 
the convention by a vote of a majority of the total number of dele-
gates to the convention. The alternative would be to impose a two-
thirds voting requirement analogous to the requirement for congres-
sional proposal of amendments. However, article V does not call for 
this, and I think that such a requirement would place an undue and 
unnecessary obstacle in the way of effective utilization of the con-
vention amendment process. 
J. Ratification of Proposed Amendments 
The bill provides that any amendment proposed by the conven-
tion must be transmitted to the Congress within the thirty days after 
the convention terminates its proceedings. The Congress must then 
transmit the proposed amendment to the Administrator of General 
Services for submission to the states. However, the Congress may, by 
concurrent resolution, refuse to approve an amendment for submis-
sion to the states for ratification, on the grounds of procedural ir-
regularities in the convention or failure of the amendment to con-
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form to the limitations on subject matter imposed by the Congress 
in the concurrent resolution calling the convention. The intent is 
to provide a means of remedying a refusal by the convention to abide 
by the limitations on its authority to amend the Constitution. Of 
course, unlimited power in the Congress to refuse to submit pro-
posed amendments for ratification would destroy the independence 
of the second alternative amending process. Therefore, the Congress 
is explicitly forbidden to refuse to submit a proposed amendment 
for ratification because of doubts about the merits of its substantive 
provisions. The power is reserved for use only with respect to amend-
ments outside the scope of the convention's authority or in the case 
of serious procedural irregularities. 
Ratification by the states must be by state legislative action or 
convention, as the Congress may direct, and within the time period 
specified by the Congress. The Congress retains the power to review 
the validity of ratification procedures. As noted earlier, any state 
may rescind its prior ratification of an amendment by the same pro-
cesses by which it ratified it, except that no state may rescind after 
that amendment has been validly ratified by three-fourths of the 
states. When three-fourths of the states have ratified a proposed 
amendment, the Administrator of General Services shall issue a proc-
lamation that the amendment is a part of the Constitution, effective 
from the date of the last necessary ratification. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
There is some evidence that the current effort to require the 
Congress to call a convention to propose a reapportionment amend-
ment has failed and that the danger of a constitutional crisis has 
passed. The two additional applications needed to bring the total 
to thirty-four have not been received and there is a strong likelihood 
that some applicant states will rescind their applications. Even if 
this is the case, however, the need for legislation to implement arti-
cle V remains. There may well be other attempts to utilize the con-
vention amendment process and, in the absence of legislation, the 
same unanswered questions will return to plague us. The legislation 
therefore is still timely, and the Congress may now have the oppor-
tunity to deal with the sensitive constitutional issues objectively, 
uninfluenced by competing views on state apportionment or any 
other substantive issue. 
Some have argued that the convention method of amendment is 
an anomaly in the law, out of step with modern notions of majority 
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rule and the relationship between the states and the federal govern-
ment. If so, that part of article V should be stricken from the Con-
stitution by the appropriate amendment process. It should not, how-
ever, be undermined by erecting every possible barrier in the way 
of its effective use. Such a course would be a disavowal of the clear 
language and history of article V. The Constitution made the amend-
ment process difficult, and properly so. It certainly was not the in-
tention of the original Convention to make it impossible. Nor is it 
possible to conclude that the Founders intended that amendments 
originating in the states should have so much harder a time of it 
than those proposed by Congress. As I have pointed out, that issue 
was fought out in 1787 Convention and resolved in favor of two 
originating sources, both difficult of achievement, but neither im-
possible and neither more difficult than the other. My bill seeks to 
preserve the symmetry of article V by implementing the convention 
alternative so as to make it a practicable but not easy method of 
constitutional amendment. 
896 Michigan Law Review 
APPENDIX 
s. 2307 
[Vol. 66:875 
IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES 
A BILL 
To provide procedures for calling constitutional conventions 
for proposing amendments to the Constitution of the United 
States, on application of the legislatures of two-thirds of the 
States, pursuant to article V of the Constitution. 
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled, 
That this Act may be cited as the "Federal Constitution Con-
vention Amendment Act." 
APPLICATIONS FOR CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION 
SEC. 2. The legislature of a State, in making application to the 
Congress for a constitutional convention under article V of the Con-
stitution of the United States, shall adopt a resolution pursuant to 
this Act stating, in substance, that the legislature requests the calling 
of a convention for the purpose of proposing one or more amend-
ments to the Constitution of the United States and stating the nature 
of the amendment or amendments to be proposed. 
APPLICATION PROCEDURE 
SEC. 3(a) For the purpose of adopting or rescinding a resolu-
tion pursuant to section 2, the State legislature shall follow the rules 
of procedure that govern the enactment of a statute by that legis-
lature, but without the need for approval of the legislature's action 
by the governor of the State. 
(b) Questions concerning the State legislative procedure 
and the validity of the adoption of a State resolution cognizable 
under this Act shall be determinable by the Congress of the United 
States and its decisions thereon shall be binding on all others, in-
cluding State and Federal courts. 
TRANSMITTAL OF APPLICATIONS 
SEC. 4(a) Within thirty days after the adoption by the legisla-
ture of a State of a resolution to apply for the calling of a constitu-
tional convention, the secretary of state of the State, or if there be 
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no such officer, the person who is charged by the State law with such 
function, shall transmit to the Congress of the United States two 
copies of the application, one addressed to the President of the Sen-
ate, and one to the Speaker of the House of Representatives. 
(b) Each copy of the application so made by any State 
shall contain-
(!) the title of the resolution, 
(2) the exact text of the resolution, signed by the 
presiding officer of each house of the State legislature, and 
(3) the date on which the legislature adopted the 
resolution; and shall be accompanied by a certificate of the secretary 
of state of the State, or such other person as is charged by the State 
law with such function, certifying that the application accurately 
sets forth the text of the resolution. 
(c) Within ten days after receipt of a copy of any such 
application, the President of the Senate and Speaker of the House 
of Representatives shall report to the House of which he is presiding 
officer, identifying the State making application, the subject of the 
application, and the number of States then having made application 
on such subject. The President of the Senate and Speaker of the 
House of Representatives shall cause copies of such application to 
be sent to the presiding officer of each House of the legislature of 
every other State and to each member of the Senate and House of 
Representatives of the Congress of the United States. 
EFFECTIVE PERIOD OF APPLICATIONS 
SEC. 5(a) An application submitted to the Congress by a State 
pursuant to this Act, unless sooner rescinded by the State legislature, 
shall remain effective for four calendar years after the date it is re-
ceived by the Congress, except that whenever the Congress deter-
mines that within a period of four calendar years two-thirds or more 
of the several States have each submitted a valid application calling 
for a constitutional convention on the same subject all such applica-
tions shall remain in effect until the Congress has taken action on a 
concurrent resolution, pursuant to section 8, calling for a constitu-
tional convention. 
(b) A State may rescind its application calling for a con-
stitutional convention by adopting and transmitting to the Congress 
a resolution of rescission in conformity with the procedure specified 
in sections 3 and 4, except that no such rescission shall be effective as 
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to any valid application made for a constitutional convention upon 
any subject after the date on which two-thirds or more of the State 
legislatures have valid applications pending before the Congress 
seeking amendments on the same subject. 
(c) Questions concerning the rescission of a State's ap-
plication shall be determined solely by the Congress of the United 
States and its decisions shall be binding on all others, including 
State and Federal courts. 
CALLING OF A CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION 
SEC. 6(a) It shall be the duty of the Secretary of the Senate and 
the Clerk of the House of Representatives to maintain a record of 
all applications received by the President of the Senate and Speaker 
of the House of Representatives from States for the calling of a con-
stitutional convention upon each subject. Whenever the Secretary 
or the Clerk has reason to believe that valid applications made by 
two-thirds or more of the States with respect to the same subject are 
in effect, he shall so report in writing to the officer to whom those 
applications were transmitted, and such officer thereupon shall an-
nounce upon the floor of the House of which he is an officer the 
substance of such report. Pursuant to such rules as such House may 
adopt, it shall be the duty of such House to determine whether the 
recitation contained in any such report is correct. If either House of 
the Congress determines, upon a consideration of any such report or 
of a concurrent resolution agreed to by the other House of the Con-
gress, that there are in effect valid applications made by two-thirds 
or more of the States for the calling of a constitutional convention 
upon the same subject, it shall be the duty of that House to agree to 
a concurrent resolution calling for the convening of a Federal con-
stitutional convention upon that subject. Each such concurrent 
resolution shall (1) designate the place and time of meeting of the 
convention; (2) set forth the nature of the amendment or amend-
ments for the consideration of which the convention is called; and 
(3) authorize the appropriation of moneys for the payment of all ex-
penses of the convention, including the compensation of delegates 
and employees. A copy of each such concurrent resolution agreed to 
by both Houses of the Congress shall be transmitted forthwith to the 
presiding officer of each House of the Legislature of each State. 
(b) The convention shall be convened not later than one 
year after the adoption of the resolution. 
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DELEGATES 
SEC. 7(a) A convention called under this Act shall be composed 
of as many delegates from each State as it is entitled to Senators and 
Representatives in Congress. In each State two delegates shall be 
elected at large and one delegate shall be elected from each Con-
gressional district in the manner provided by State law. Any vacancy 
occurring in a State delegation shall be filled by appointment of the 
Governor of that State. 
(b) The secretary of state of each State, or, if there be no 
such officer, the person charged by State law to perform such func-
tion shall certify to the Vice President of the United States the name 
of each delegate elected or appointed by the Governor pursuant to 
this section. 
(c) Delegates shall in all cases, except treason, felony, and 
breach of the peace, be privileged from arrest during their atten-
dance at a session of the convention, and in going to and returning 
from the same; and for any speech or debate in the convention they 
shall not be questioned in any other place. 
(d) Each delegate shall receive compensation for each 
day of service and shall be compensated for traveling and related 
expenses. Provision shall be made therefore in the concurrent resolu-
tion calling the convention. The convention shall fix the compensa-
tion of employees of the convention. 
CONVENING THE CONVENTION 
SEC. 8(a) The Vice President of the United States shall convene 
the constitutional convention. He shall administer the oath of office 
of the delegates to the convention and shall preside until the dele-
gates elect a presiding officer who shall preside thereafter. Before 
taking his seat each delegate shall subscribe an oath not to attempt 
to change or alter any section, clause or article of the Constitution 
or propose additions thereto except in conformity with the concur-
rent resolution calling the convention. Upon the election of perma-
nent officers of the convention, the names of such officers shall be 
transmitted to the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the 
House of Representatives by the elected presiding officer of the 
convention. Further proceedings of the convention shall be con-
ducted in accordance with such rules, not inconsistent with this Act, 
as the convention may adopt. 
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(b) The Congress shall appropriate moneys for the pay-
ment of all expenses of the convention. 
(c) Under such regulations as the President shall pre-
scribe, the Administrator of General Services shall provide such 
facilities, and each executive department and agency shall provide 
such information, as the convention may require, upon written re-
quest made by the elected presiding officer of the convention. 
PROCEDURES OF THE CONVENTION 
SEC. 9(a) In voting on any question before the convention, 
including the proposal of amendments, each delegate shall have one 
vote. 
(b) The convention shall keep a daily verbatim record of 
its proceedings and publish the same. The votes of the delegates on 
any question shall be entered on the record. 
(c) The convention shall terminate its proceedings within 
one year after the date of its first meeting unless the period is ex-
tended by the Congress by concurrent resolution. 
( d) Within thirty days after the termination of the pro-
ceedings of the convention, the presiding officer shall transmit to the 
Archivist of the United States all records of official proceedings of 
the convention. 
PROPOSAL OF AMENDMENTS 
SEC. IO(a) Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, 
a convention called under this Act may propose amendments to the 
Constitution by a vote of a majority of the total number of delegates 
to the convention. 
(b) No convention called under this Act may propose any 
amendment or amendments of a general nature different from that 
stated in the concurrent resolution calling the convention. Questions 
arising under this subsection shall be determined solely by the Con-
gress of the United States and its decisions shall be binding on all 
others, including state and Federal courts. 
APPROVAL BY THE CONGRESS AND TRANSMITTAL 
TO THE STATES FOR RATIFICATION 
SEC. ll(a) The presiding officer of the convention shall, within 
thirty days after the termination of its proceedings, submit the exact 
text of any amendment or amendments agreed upon by the con-
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vention to the Congress for approval and transmittal to the several 
States for their ratification. 
(b) The Congress, before the expiration of the first period 
of three months of continuous session following receipt of any pro-
posed amendment, shall, by concurrent resolution, transmit such 
proposed amendment to the States for ratification, prescribing the 
time within which such amendment shall be ratified or deemed in-
operative and the manner in which such amendment shall be ratified 
in accordance with Article V of the Constitution: Provided, That, 
within such period, the Congress may, by concurrent resolution, dis-
approve the submission of the proposed amendment to the States for 
ratification on the ground that its general nature is different from 
that stated in the concurrent resolution calling the convention or 
that the proposal of the amendment by the convention was not in 
conformity with the provisions of this Act: Provided further, that the 
Congress shall not disapprove the submission of a proposed amend-
ment for ratification by the States because of its substantive provi-
sions. 
(c) If, upon the expiration of the period prescribed in the 
preceding subsection, the Congress has not adopted a concurrent 
resolution transmitting or disapproving the transmittal of a proposed 
amendment to the States for ratification, the President of the Senate 
and the Speaker of the House of Representatives, acting jointly, shall 
transmit such proposed amendment to the Administrator of General 
Services for submission to the States. The Administrator of General 
Services shall transmit exact copies of the same, together with his 
certification thereof, to the legislatures of the several States. 
RATIFICATION OF PROPOSED AMENDMENTS 
SEC. 12(a) Any amendment proposed by the convention and 
submitted to the States in accordance with the provisions of this Act 
shall be valid for all intents and purposes as part of the Constitution 
of the United States when duly ratified by three-fourths of the States 
in the manner and within the time specified. 
(b) Acts of ratification shall be by convention or by State 
legislative action as the Congress may direct or as specified in sub-
section (c) of this section. For the purpose of ratifying proposed 
amendments transmitted to the States pursuant to this Act the State 
legislaures shall adopt their own rules of procedure. Any State action 
ratifying a proposed amendment to the Constitution shall be valid 
without the assent of the Governor of the State. 
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(c) Any proposed amendment transmitted to the States 
pursuant to the provisions of section ll(c) of this Act shall be ratified 
by the legislatures of three-fourths of the several States within seven 
years of the date of transmittal or be deemed inoperative. 
( d) The secretary of state of the State, or if there be no 
such officer, the person who is charged by State law with such func-
tion, shall transmit a certified copy of the State action ratifying any 
proposed amendment to the Administrator of General Services. 
REsCISSION OF RATIFICATIONS 
SEC. 13(a) Any State may rescind its ratification of a proposed 
amendment by the same processes by which it ratified the proposed 
amendment, except that no State may rescind when there are exist-
ing valid ratifications of such amendment by three-fourths of the 
States. 
. (b) Any State may ratify a proposed amendment even 
though it previously may have rejected the same proposal. 
(c) Questions concerning State ratification or rejection 
of amendments proposed to the Constitution of the United States 
shall be determined solely by the Congress of the United States, and 
its decisions shall be binding on all others, including State and 
Federal courts. 
PROCLAMATION OF CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENTS 
SEC. 14. The Administrator of General Services, when three-
fourths of the several States have ratified a proposed amendment to 
the Constitution of the United States, shall issue a proclamation that 
the amendment is a part of the Constitution of the United States. 
EFFECTIVE DATE OF AMENDMENTS 
SEC. 15. An amendment proposed to the Constitution of the 
United States shall be effective from the date specified therein or, if 
no date is specified, then on the date on which the last State necessary 
to constitute three-fourths of the States of the United States, as pro-
vided for in article V, has ratified the same. 
